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We End Where We Began
The Other Suspects
But what of  Vice-President-elect Joe Biden, long the 
ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee? Given his background and decades-long 
interest in foreign relations, shouldn’t he be considered 
a candidate for the driver of  American foreign policy? 
One of  Biden’s strengths is his refreshing habit of  
saying exactly what he means almost all the time; his 
is a very uncharacteristic American politician. Biden 
has been commendably clear that while he will be in 
the room for all the major decisions Obama has to 
make and will thus have a direct say in everything, his 
mission is to downsize the Vice-Presidency from the 
Cheney / Gore model. After the constitutional night-
mare of  the Cheney years this is surely to be welcomed. 
However, with the planned bureaucratic shrinkage of  
his office, coupled with the fact that he was an early 
and vociferous supporter of  Hillary for Secretary of  
State, Biden actually means what he has been saying 
about foreign affairs: He will not run the show.
Obama’s decision to keep Robert Gates as Secretary of  
Defense was a masterstroke. At one blow he exacerbat-
ed a devastating split within the Republican Party, as re-
alists on the left of  the GOP warmly welcomed Gates’s 
retention, while die-hard neo-cons glumly wondered 
how a Republican could work for the enemy. No one 
doubts Secretary Gates’s ability. Given the thankless 
job of  taking over after the shambles Donald Rumsfeld 
left the Department of  Defense in, Gates has restored 
morale, overseen the partial stabilizing of  Iraq through 
the surge (even if  the plan’s political goals have not 
been remotely met), and focused attention on the crisis 
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Die entscheidende Figur der amerikanischen Außenpolitik in den nächsten vier Jahren heißt nicht Barack Obama, 
sondern Hillary Clinton. Ausgelastet durch das Management der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise wird Obama 
zwar der letztinstanzliche Entscheider bei der internationalen Neuausrichtung Amerikas sein, seine politische 
und intellektuelle Kraft aber vor allem an anderer Stelle einsetzen müssen. Vizepräsident Joseph Biden wird ob 
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das Amt des zweiten Mannes nach den Gore- und Cheney-Jahren wieder auf  Normalmaß zu kürzen. Vertei-
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in Afghanistan. In fact, over military strategy in the 
Middle East, Gates’s position is closer to that of  his 
new boss rather than his old one: He has long advo-
cated a shifting of  troops and emphasis away from Iraq 
toward dealing with the resurgent Taliban and al-Qa-
eda on the Afghan/Pakistan border, the actual people 
who perpetrated 9/11, rather than continuing to try to 
remake the Middle East in the American image.
But Gates has already made it clear that he is weary 
of  his onerous job. While he has agreed to stay on, it 
is highly unlikely that he will be in his position by the 
end of  Obama’s first term; despite his recent deni-
als he probably already has at least one foot out the 
door. Lame duck figures are rarely called upon to be 
the overall steward of  American foreign policy. There 
is also the fact that Gates will be very focused on the 
major task of  winding down Iraq and ramping up 
Afghanistan, which will leave him precious little time 
to concentrate on the larger geopolitical shifts that 
have occurred over the past decade, and how to adjust 
American foreign policy accordingly. Secretary Gates 
will continue to play a critical role, but he will not be 
primus inter pares.
The new head of  the National Security Council, Gen-
eral James Jones, is a fine and capable compliment to 
Secretary Gates. During his time as Supreme Com-
mander of  NATO (SACEUR), Jones seemed to fit 
the mold of  the soldier-diplomat, reminding admiring 
Europeans of  George Marshall and Dwight Eisen-
hower, in his ability to make coalition-building a central 
part of  America’s military strategy. Jones is an un-
doubted expert on Afghanistan, and will work closely 
with Gates to try to stabilize the very tenuous political 
situation there.
However, like another former general who held the 
NSC position, Brent Scowcroft, Jones is unlikely to fit 
one model for running the NSC—being the intellectual 
powerhouse who is the primary feeder of  ideas to the 
new administration. Jones is no Zbigniew Brzezinski or 
Henry Kissinger. Rather, like Scowcroft, he will serve 
as the president’s enforcer, keeping the major foreign 
policy players singing from the same hymnal, making 
sure that American foreign policy is coherent. This is 
a tough and necessary job. However, it precludes him 
from intellectually dominating the new administration.
What of Obama?
And what of  the new President? It is true that constitu-
tionally the chief  executive has always been the domi-
nant player in constructing American foreign policy. 
Further, most modern presidents have relished the 
role, as they have far fewer constraints placed on them 
than over domestic affairs (where Congress always has 
a significant role), and have a real chance to make their 
historical mark. For example, John Kennedy picked 
Dean Rusk to be his Secretary of  State, precisely 
because Rusk was a second-class talent, competent to 
run the bureaucracy at State, but unlikely to get in the 
president’s way. As is true with most modern presi-
dents, JFK wanted to be his own Secretary of  State.
Curiously, this is not the case with Obama. Over-
whelmingly elected to deal with the worst economic 
crisis in 80 years (in exit polls voters named economic 
concerns the first six reasons they voted for a particu-
lar candidate), it is folly to expect Obama to have the 
time or inclination to deal with much of  anything else. 
While he will always have the final say, nothing in his 
record as community organizer, Illinois State Senator, 
or junior Senator in Washington, would lead one to 
believe he wanted to be president to mold American 
foreign policy. This, coupled with the times we live in, 
means that while he still runs American Foreign Policy, 
his mind, time, and energy, will be directed elsewhere.
Hillary, Again
These bureaucratic realities explain the mystery as to 
why Hillary would forsake her independent power base 
in the Senate (where she was electorally impregnable 
in New York) to work for the man who, in the eyes 
of  many of  her rabid supporters, stole the presidency 
from her. Always a clever tactician (if  not much of  a 
strategist), Hillary must have seen that she would have 
a unique opportunity, at last, to make her mark in his-
tory, apart from being merely a major but lesser player 
in the Bill Clinton drama. With the field, through both 
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temperament and circumstance, bureaucratically clear, 
it is amazingly Hillary, at the end of  this wild year, who 
will largely shape American foreign policy in the new 
administration. Somehow, some way, much like Bill, 
Hillary found her way back to the top.
Final Cautionary Notes
No one sensible doubts Mrs. Clinton’s tenacity, brains, 
or drive. She emerged as a very successful Senator, 
who learned the very strange rules of  the place, prov-
ing herself  unusually effective at working across the 
aisle with Republicans to get things done. She has been 
underestimated throughout her career, to the peril of  
many. From a European point of  view she is a com-
mitted internationalist, who will naturally try to resur-
rect the transatlantic alliance, while listening far more 
to the concerns of  American allies.
So far, so good. But one major caveat must be placed 
on her ascendancy. First, while Obama’s foreign policy 
team is unusually capable, there is not a geopolitical 
thinker among them. That is, these are people who 
play the cards that are dealt them very well, but are 
less good at considering the nature of  the game they 
are playing. And given the shift in era, a geopolitical 
thinker is very much needed now. During the campaign, 
when foreign policy was discussed, Hillary exhibited 
a disturbing yearning to return to the easier, happier 
days of  her husband’s presidency. But history does not 
work like that; only reactionaries think the past can be 
recaptured.
It is worse if  policy is based on a misreading of  Amer-
ica’s relative power in the world. Of  course it is tempt-
ing to wish America back to the 1990s, when it was far 
and away the greatest power in the world, where signs 
of  decline were few, and where America, through skill-
ful engagement, could achieve the great majority of  its 
foreign policy goals. For Americans it is an understand-
able human reaction to yearn for this period; under-
standable, but horribly misguided. For the overarching 
task of  American foreign policy in the new era will be 
to maintain America as first among equals in a time of  
increasing multipolarity, when rising powers such as 
China, India, Brazil and Russia must be made stake-
holders in the new global order. To not accurately see 
America’s position in this new era is to fail; there are 
precious few signs anyone around Mrs. Clinton truly 
understands the seismic geostrategic shifts of  the past 
decade.
What this means is that the way remains open for 
new, edgy, innovative thinking about foreign relations, 
as policy-makers around the world struggle to make 
sense of  a new era few of  them have had the time or 
the inclination to think about. We end where we be-
gan: the man and the country that holds the world in 
the palm of  his hand is one who can creatively see the 
world as it is, and devise concrete policies to further 
common global goals. May we all prove to have the 
intellect, and the decency, to make the new era a bet-
ter one than the old.
John C. Hulsman, Ph. D., was the first Alfred von 
Oppenheim Scholar in Residence at the German Council 
on Foreign Relations in Berlin. His new book, The 
Godfather Doctrine, will be published by Princeton 
University Press in February 2009, and is available for pre-
order on the American version of <Amazon.com>.
